Plausible Pleading: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly by Steuer, Richard M.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 82 
Number 3 Volume 82, Summer 2008, Number 3 Article 3 
January 2012 
Plausible Pleading: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
Richard M. Steuer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Steuer, Richard M. (2008) "Plausible Pleading: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 
82 : No. 3 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol82/iss3/3 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
PLAUSIBLE PLEADING:
BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V. TWOMBL Y
RICHARD M. STEUERt
INTRODUCTION
Motions to dismiss antitrust cases have gone in and out of
favor over the years. There was a time when plaintiffs-especially
government plaintiffs-needed to plead little more than that
defendants had conspired to fix prices and restrain trade. More
recently, many courts began demanding appreciably more than
conclusory allegations of conspiracy and unreasonable restraint of
competition, including both some factual allegations and a theory
of liability that makes sense.1 Meanwhile, some other courts
t Partner, Mayer Brown LLP; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1973;
B.A., Hofstra University, 1970.
1 See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Counsel of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983) (noting that "a district court must retain the power to
insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual
[antitrust] controversy to proceed" and thus reversing a court of appeals that had
reversed a district court for granting a motion to dismiss); Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v.
Fla. Power & Light Co., 145 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 1998) ("[S]uch vague,
conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted."); Estate Constr. Co. v. Miller & Smith Holding Co., 14 F.3d 213, 221 (4th
Cir. 1994) (holding that an antitrust claim was properly dismissed where plaintiffs
"fail[ed] to provide any factual support for their allegations that a conspiracy
existed"); Penn. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988)
(stating that "only allegations of conspiracy which are particularized ... will be
deemed sufficient" on a motion to dismiss (quoting Garshman v. Universal Res.
Holding, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 1359, 1370 (D.N.J. 1986), aff'd, 824 F.2d 223 (3d Cir.
1987))); Lombard's, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 753 F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir. 1985)
("[Clonclusory allegations 'will not survive a motion to dismiss if not supported by
the facts constituting a legitimate claim for relief.'" (quoting Quality Foods v. Latin
Am. Agribusiness Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d 989, 995 (11th Cir. 1983))); Terry's Floor
Fashions, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 763 F.2d 604, 611 (4th Cir. 1985)
(" '[P]laintiffs conclusion or speculation as to existence of a conspiracy, without
more, is not sufficient ... ' (quoting Terry's Floor Fashions v. Burlington Indus.,
568 F. Supp. 205, 210 (E.D.N.C. 1983))); Gilbuilt Homes, Inc. v. Cont'l Homes of New
Eng., 667 F.2d 209, 210 (1st Cir. 1981) (affirming dismissal of Sherman Act cause of
action because plaintiff "failed to allege facts suggesting that the decision to
terminate plaintiff as a dealer was other than ... a unilateral decision"); Havoco of
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continued to insist that pleading requirements are intended to be
minimal, and that only plaintiffs pleading nothing but conclusions
should be denied the opportunity for discovery. 2
Through the decades, discovery itself changed dramatically.
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938,
photostats were only thirty years old and xerography had not
quite been invented.3 The creators of the concept of liberal
discovery could not possibly contemplate the nature or volume of
the electronic data and documents that would proliferate seventy
years later.
These two trends converged in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly,4 an antitrust case with broad implications for pleading
all federal claims.
There can be little doubt that the Supreme Court purposefully
recalibrated the pleading requirements under Rule 12(b)(6) in
Twombly. In a 7-2 decision, the Court reversed the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals and upheld the district court's dismissal of an
antitrust conspiracy complaint on the ground that the allegations
of the complaint failed to provide "plausible grounds to infer an
agreement."5  The High Court's opinion, authored by Justice
Am., Ltd., v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549, 558 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Not only is the
allegation conclusionary, but further, the complaint is utterly devoid of any
supporting factual allegations .... We are simply unwilling to construe pleadings so
liberally .. "); Larry R. George Sales Co. v. Cool Attic Corp., 587 F.2d 266, 273-74
(5th Cir. 1979) (affirming dismissal of Sherman Act § 1 claim because when alleging
conspiracy, "[t]he pleader must allege the facts constituting the conspiracy, its object
and accomplishment"); Cal. Dump Truck Owners Ass'n v. Associated Gen.
Contractors of Am., 562 F.2d 607, 615 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that the "amended
complaint fail[ed] to adequately inform the appellees of the appellants' claim of
a... conspiracy"); Floors-N-More, Inc. v. Freight Liquidators, 142 F. Supp. 2d 496,
501 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[P]laintiff must do more than allege the existence of a
conspiracy-it must allege some facts in support of the claim."); Cont'l Orthopedic
Appliances, Inc. v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 956 F. Supp. 367, 373 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) ("[C]onclusory allegations which merely recite the litany of antitrust will not
suffice.").
2 See, e.g., Invamed, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 210, 216 (S.D.N.Y,
1998) ("In antitrust cases, 'where the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged
conspirators," dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery
should be granted very sparingly.'" (quoting Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of the Rex Hosp.,
425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
3 See David Walton, Machine Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2004, § 7, at 35.
4 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
5 Id. at 1965. The Court held that the claims pleaded must cross "the line from
conceivable to plausible." Id. at 1974. This may be compared with the line between
plausible and the apparently stricter standard established by Congress for securities
fraud. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000) (requiring a complaint to "state with
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Souter, recognized that instances of competitors responding in the
same way to the same set of circumstances do not constitute
evidence of conspiracy and, for this reason, "an allegation of
parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not
suffice. ' 6  The Court pointedly observed that "antitrust
discovery can be expensive," generating "reams and gigabytes
of business records," and unless implausible claims are weeded
out at the pleading stage, "the threat of discovery expense will
push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases
before reaching [summary judgment or trial] ."7
The complaint in Twombly was filed on behalf of consumers
of telephone service, seeking class treatment.8 The plaintiffs
alleged anticompetitive conduct by local telephone companies,
including refusal to deal with competitors, providing inferior
connections to their networks, overcharging, and engaging in
improper billing practices, coupled with a published statement by
one of the company's CEOs that competition "might be a good
way to turn a quick dollar but that doesn't make it right."9
This was not enough to state a claim, but it does provide
plenty of insight into what will and will not suffice under the
pleading standard that the Court announced.
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind" (emphasis added)). In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2404-05 (2007), a suit brought by shareholders alleging
securities fraud under 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the Supreme Court rejected a plausibility standard in construing the "strong
inference" language of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PSLRA"). That Act requires dismissal of a complaint unless it lists "with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference" of scienter or fraudulent intent.
Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2501 (quoting PSLRA § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)).
The Court resolved a split among the circuits by declaring that "[tlo qualify as
'strong'.. . an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or
reasonable-it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference
of nonfraudulent intent." Id. at 2502 (emphasis added); see also Steven Wolowitz &
Joseph de Simone, Did Tellabs' Raise PSLRA Scienter Bar?, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 3, 2007,
at S3.
6 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966.
7 Id. at 1967. Some earlier cases had expressed similar concerns. E.g., Valley
Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Imps., Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that
courts should hesitate before "trundling out the great machinery of antitrust
enforcement").
8 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1962.
9 Id.
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I. No MORE INFERRING CONSPIRACY FROM PARALLEL BEHAVIOR
Twombly effectively heralded that the days of alleging a
"conceivable" antitrust conspiracy in order to survive a motion to
dismiss are over. After Twombly, a complaint must allege
sufficient "factual matter (taken as true)" to "plausibly suggesto"
that parallel conduct among competitors was the product of a
"preceding agreement," and was "not merely parallel conduct that
could just as well be independent action." 10 To illustrate the kind
of allegations that would suffice to meet this test, the Court
pointed to allegations of the "specific time, place, [and] person
involved in the alleged conspiracies"-i.e., "which [defendants]
supposedly agreed" and "when and where the illicit agreement
took place."11
The Court's analysis is premised on the principle that
parallel decisions among competing companies to make more
money or, presumably, to pursue any goal that would be in
each defendant's self-interest in the absence of conspiracy, 12 is
not evidence of a conspiracy. Because such decisions would be in
the individual interest of each of the companies, the same
decisions just as likely would be reached in the absence of an
agreement. Consequently, it has long been settled that such
parallel self-interested conduct does not constitute evidence of
conspiracy. 13
To punctuate this point, the Supreme Court pointed out that,
even absent conspiracy, it is not ordinarily in the individual
interest of any company to ignite competition every chance it
gets. 14 Accordingly, it is never enough for a plaintiff simply to
allege that companies must have been colluding or else they
would have been competing against one another harder and
sooner. To the contrary, the Court acknowledged that "resisting
10 Id. at 1965-66.
11 Id. at 1971 n.10 (emphasis added). The dissent criticized this reference by
pointing out petitioners' concession at oral argument that they were not asserting a
lack of specificity in the complaint, id. at 1985 n.9, and that Form 9 in the appendix
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on which the majority relied, "states only"
that the defendant "negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then
crossing said highway," id. at 1977.
12 In Twombly, the goal of the incumbent telephone companies was "to keep
[new competitors] out and manifest disinterest in becoming [new competitors]
themselves." Id. at 1971.
13 Id. at 1968 & n.7 ("[N]either parallel conduct nor conscious parallelism,
taken alone, raise the necessary implication of conspiracy . .
14 Id. at 1971.
[Vol. 82:861
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competition is routine market conduct" and "only natural anyway;
so natural, in fact, that if alleging parallel decisions to resist
competition were enough to imply an antitrust conspiracy, pleading
a § 1 violation against almost any group of competing businesses
would be a sure thing."15
In the district court opinion below, Judge Lynch had noted
that "parallel action is a common and often legitimate
phenomenon, because similar market actors with similar
information and economic interests will often reach the same
business decisions." 16 Then, in language quoted by the Supreme
Court and derived from earlier cases concerning summary
judgment, the district court held that at the pleading stage,
although plaintiffs obviously need not present evidence that
will "tend[] to exclude independent self-interested conduct,"
they must make allegations tending to exclude such conduct "as
an explanation for the defendants' parallel behavior."17
The Supreme Court elaborated on this requirement,
explaining that there must be allegations of "parallel behavior
that would probably not result from chance, coincidence,
independent responses to common stimuli, or mere
interdependence unaided by an advance understanding among the
parties. 18  The concept of "advance understanding"--or as the
Court also termed it, "a preceding agreement"19-has emerged as
crucial to meeting the Court's new formulation of the applicable
test. To plead such an advance understanding adequately, there
must be "factual enhancement" 20 with "allegations plausibly
suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement"21 and
amounting to "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face."22 In other words, parallel behavior without
15 Id.
16 Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd,
425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
17 Id.; Cf. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)
("[Slomething more than evidence of complaints is needed. There must be evidence
that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated
distributors were acting independently.").
18 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966 n.4 (quoting 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION 1425a, at 167 (2d ed. 2003)).
19 Id. at 1966.
20 Id. at 1959.
21 Id. at 1966.
22 Id. at 1960.
2008]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
a factual allegation of a prior agreement will not suffice to state a
valid claim.
II. THE PRIOR "PLUS FACTOR" APPROACH
Prior to Twombly, most courts applied a so-called "plus
factor" analysis, under which parallel behavior-or "conscious
parallelism"--could provide sufficient basis for pleading a
Sherman Act violation even if supported only by such "plus
factors" as "motive," opportunity to conspire, or "pervasiveness."23
The Supreme Court had repeatedly rejected the notion that
conscious parallelism alone could state a claim under § 1 of the
Sherman Act.24 The "plus factor" approach, however-which the
Supreme Court itself never addressed-won considerable
acceptance among the lower courts. 25
All that changed with Twombly. The Supreme Court did not
include "plus factors" in its new test; instead, as noted above, the
Court required "factual enhancement"26 adding up to "enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible,"27 such as the
"specific time, place, or person involved in the alleged
conspiracies." 2  Lower courts already have begun to recognize
and embrace this shift, and they began to abandon the plus
factor test immediately. 29
Nevertheless, this leaves open the question whether any of
the old "plus factors" will survive as providing a sufficient degree
of "factual enhancement" to qualify as demonstrating
"plausibility" under Twombly. The more amorphous of these
23 See Michael D. Blechman, Conscious Parallelism, Signalling and Facilitating
Devices: The Problem of Tacit Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 881, 883-87 & nn.11-19 (1979). The court in Iqbal v. Hasty, a qualified
immunity case, acknowledged that the "full force" of Twombly applies, and "is
limited to," the "antitrust context." 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007).
24 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968 n.7.
25 See EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND
ECONOMICS 768 (2007).
26 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966.
27 Id. at 1974.
28 Id. at 1970 n.10.
29 See, e.g., Wellnx Life Scis. Inc. v. Iovate Health Scis. Res. Inc., 516 F. Supp.
2d 270, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (" 'Plus' factors ... do not constitute plausible grounds to
infer an agreement .... ); Schafer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F. Supp. 2d
587, 596 (E.D. La. 2007) ("[T]he Twombly ruling supersedes any articulation of the
'plus factor' test .... ); see also In re Late Fee & Over-Limit Fee Litig., 528 F. Supp.
2d 953, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding alleged plus factors insufficient to plead a
case).
[Vol. 82:861866
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"plus factors"-including motive or opportunity to conspire and
the pervasiveness of a practice-have long been criticized
because they never were reliable indicators of collusion and
always were largely consistent with "parallel conduct that could
just as well be independent action."30
A law review article cited in Twombly criticized those "plus
factors" that possessed little probative value on the ground that
they did not adequately "distinguish between conscious
parallelism and conspiracy."31 Twombly cited this article, 32 not to
suggest that the old "plus factors" would suffice under its new
test, but to demonstrate that under the new test there still exist
"examples" of certain alleged conduct that legitimately could
provide "plausible grounds to infer an agreement."33  The
examples cited there, however-such as companies that imposed
penalties upon themselves for price cutting and companies that
felt the need to explain their pricing errors to competitors-are
far more probative of conspiracy than simple notions of motive,
opportunity, or pervasiveness.
What all of the examples that the Court cited approvingly
have in common is that each demonstrates a consciousness of
commitment to an agreement by featuring both "restricted
freedom of action" and a "sense of obligation."34 In other words,
factors that reflect a conscious commitment to an illegal
agreement will suffice, but factors that could just as well reflect
independent action will not. Some of the most questionable "plus
factors" under the old test were opportunity to conspire, "motive"
to conspire, market concentration, parallel pricing, and
"pervasiveness. ' 35  None of these appears likely to survive
Twombly.
30 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966; see, e.g., Blechman, supra note 23, at 898.
31 Blechman, supra note 23, at 898.
32 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966 n.4 (citing Blechman, supra note 23, at 899).
33 Id. at 1965, 1966 n.4.
34 Id. at 1966 n.4. More specifically, the examples cited were of companies that:
(1) decline to pursue profitable business in arbitrary categories; (2) rigidly refuse to
make sales by lowering prices by even de minimis amounts; (3) furnish competitors
detailed information about their own operations; (4) impose penalties upon
themselves for price cutting; or (5) feel the need to report and explain pricing errors
to competitors. Id.
35 See Blechman, supra note 23, at 885-87.
20081
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A. Opportunity to Conspire
Opportunities to conspire are not, in themselves, either
meetings of the mind or conspiracies. 36 Indeed, in Twombly, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants would "'communicate
amongst themselves' through numerous industry associations,"
and had "numerous opportunities to meet with each other,"37 but
the Supreme Court held that this was not sufficient to raise an
inference of conspiracy.38 Significantly, the dissent in Twombly
recognized the view that "an allegation that competitors meet on a
regular basis, like the allegations of parallel conduct, is consistent
with ... an unlawful agreement."39 But seven Justices rejected
this position and ordered the complaint dismissed.40
B. Motive to Conspire
Under the prior test, plaintiffs regularly claimed that
defendants had a motive to fix prices, relying on cases
purportedly holding that parallel pricing plus a motive to
conspire to charge higher prices can, without more, overcome a
motion to dismiss.41 This appears to be precisely what Twombly
rejects by recognizing that the "natural" instinct to avoid
competition and make more money rather than less money is not
probative of conspiracy. 42
36 See Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537,
545 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The mere opportunity to conspire does not by itself support the
inference that such an illegal combination actually occurred."); In re Late Fee &
Over-Limit Fee Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 953, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("[O]ther courts
have consistently refused to infer the existence of a conspiracy from these kinds of
averments.").
37 127 S. Ct. at 1974, 1986.
38 See id. at 1971.
39 Id. at 1986 n.10.
40 The leading case suggesting that mere opportunity to communicate was ever
a "plus factor," C-O Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir.
1952), abrogated by Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Dist. Corp., 346 U.S.
537 (1954), was a case brought before the Supreme Court had clarified that conscious
parallelism alone does not violate the Sherman Act, and a case that involved
additional evidence-submitting identical bids, raising prices during a time of
surplus, artificial standardization of products and policing of pricing compliance. See
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968 n.7.
41 See, e.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp. 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977); Venzie
Corp. v. U.S. Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1314 (3d Cir 1975).
42 127 S. Ct. at 1971; see also In re Bath & Kitchen Fixtures Antitrust Litig., No.
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C. Market Concentration
High market concentration likewise should not suffice as an
alleged fact that "raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement"
to fix prices under the Twombly requirement of "allegations
plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement."43
Whether or not the level of market concentration is consistent
with particular conduct, the market shares of firms competing in
an industry are not "conduct" and do not imply that an
anticompetitive agreement has been made. Alleging parallel
conduct within a concentrated market may have been enough to
plead a section 1 violation at one time, but that day has passed. 44
D. Parallel Prices
Evidence that prices are all at or about the same level will
almost always exist in competitive markets-indeed, perfectly
competitive markets are characterized by all competitors charging
identical prices. 45  If such evidence constituted evidence of
conspiracy, nearly every market would be subject to antitrust
allegations every day.
Furthermore, care must be taken not to confuse unexplained
price increases, in which a group of competing sellers-usually of
undifferentiated commodities-all raise their prices at the same
time even though costs remain the same, 46 with the situation in
05-cv-00510 MAM, 2006 WL 2038605, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 2006); AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, 1434c, 1434cl, 1434c2, at 243-46 (stating that
"motivation" is synonymous with "interdependent parallelism," which is not a § 1
violation, and that "conspicuous by its rarity is the occasional court suggesting that
conspiratorial motivation" suffices); Blechman, supra note 23, at 898 ("The
problem ... with a 'plus factor' test which depends upon whether particular conduct
is or is not contrary to companies' 'independent self-interest' is that it does not, by
itself, distinguish between conscious parallelism and conspiracy.").
43 127 S. Ct. at 1966.
44 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968 n.7 (rejecting Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248
F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957)); In re Late Fee & Over-Limit Fee Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d
953, 961-62 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
45 See Alan J. Daskin & Lawrence Wu, Observations on the Multiple Dimensions
of Market Power, ANTITRUST, Summer 2005, at 53, 54; see also Matsushita Elec.
Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).
46 This is what Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp discuss in the
passage cited in Twombly. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, 1425c, at 170
('When two competitors announce a price increase or an identical change in business
at the very same moment a conspiracy may be the explanation, although not
necessarily .... "); Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 n.4; see also RICHARD POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAw 88 (2d ed. 2001) ("Simultaneous price increases and output
20081
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which sellers continue to charge the same prices over a period of
time even though their costs decline over that period. It is hardly
probative of conspiracy for competitors to continue to charge the
same prices when customers keep buying their products at those
prices, and not to begin charging less just because they can, as
the Supreme Court implicitly recognized in Twombly. 47
E. Pervasiveness
The "pervasiveness" of parallel conduct sometimes has been
identified as a plus factor, 48 but the more efficient a practice is
within an industry, the more pervasive it is likely to be. While
the pervasiveness of a practice within a market may magnify its
impact, 49 it does not tend to prove that the practice was adopted
as the result of a preceding agreement rather than through
independent business judgments reaching the same conclusion.
"Pervasiveness" is as likely to show the efficacy of a practice as it
is to show conspiracy.
III. BEYOND PLUS FACTORS: THE NEW PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD
The bedrock underlying the plus factor approach was the
Supreme Court's 1957 decision in Conley v. Gibson,50 which held
that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
reductions unexplained by any increases in cost may therefore be good evidence of
the initiation of a price-fixing scheme, while changes in the opposite direction would
be evidence that a cartel had just collapsed."). There is a difference between a group
of competitors all raising their prices at the same time notwithstanding the absence
of any concurrent change in cost--or demand-and a group of competitors keeping
their prices the same during a period when costs begin to fall-or demand begins to
rise. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1971 (stating that "resisting competition is
routine"); accord Petruzzi's IGA Supermkts., Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d 1224,
1244 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[Sellers] might [all charge] the same above-marginal cost
price ... because [they assume that] "competitors would match any price
cut .... Accordingly, Areeda warns courts not to consider a failure to cut
prices ... as an action against self-interest .... ).
47 127 S. Ct. at 1971 (stating that "there is no reason to infer" that companies
which could have competed harder than they "had agreed among themselves.., to
resist competition"); see also In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir.
2007) ("[S]imilar pricing can suggest competition at least as plausibly as it can
suggest anticompetitive conspiracy .... ").
48 See Blechman, supra note 23, at 886, 898.
49 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 309 (1949); In re
Beltone Elec. Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68 (1982).
50 355 U.S. 41 (1957), overruled in part by Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct.
1955 (2007)
[Vol. 82:861870
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no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief."51  Twombly unceremoniously relegated Conley to
"retirement," criticizing it on the ground that it could be, and had
been, interpreted to mean that "any statement revealing the
theory of the claim will suffice unless its factual impossibility
may be shown from the face of the pleadings .... ."52 With the
demise of Conley, the Supreme Court also effectively marked the
retirement of the plus factor approach and its replacement with a
new approach that "require[s] enough facts" to make the claims
in a complaint plausible. 53
The new test immediately began to take shape in the lower
courts. One of the first leading illustrations was In re Elevator
Antitrust Litigation,54 where the plaintiffs pleaded that the
defendants:
(a) Participated in meetings in the United States and Europe to
discuss pricing and market divisions; (b) Agreed to fix prices for
elevators and services; (c) Rigged bids for sales and
maintenance; (d) Exchanged price quotes; (e) Allocated markets
for sales and maintenance; (f) "Collusively" required customers
to enter long-term maintenance contracts; and (g) Collectively
took actions to drive independent repair companies out of
business. 55
This was not enough to state a claim. 56
The Second Circuit, quoting the district court, held that the
complaint "enumerat[ed] 'basically every type of conspiratorial
activity that one could imagine.... The list is in entirely general
terms without any specification of any particular activities by
any particular defendant[; it] is nothing more than a list of
theoretical possibilities, which one could postulate without
knowing any facts whatever.' ,5 The Second Circuit added:
Similar contract terms can reflect similar bargaining power and
commercial goals (not to mention boilerplate); similar contract
51 Id. at 45-46.
52 127 S. Ct. at 1968-69.
53 Id. at 1974.
54 502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007).
55 Id. at 51 n.5.
56 See id. at 50.
57 Id. at 50-51 (quoting In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., No. 04 CV 1178 (TPG),
2006 WL 1470994, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2006)). Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct.
2197 (2007), confirms that "[sipecific facts are not necessary" to provide defendants
fair notice of the claims, id. at 2200, but Erickson, an Eighth Amendment action,
cites and reconfirms Twombly, id.
20081
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language can reflect the copying of documents that may not be
secret; similar pricing can suggest competition at least as
plausibly as it can suggest anticompetitive conspiracy; and
similar equipment design can reflect the state of the art.58
The court further added that allegations of collusion in Europe
would not suffice "[w]ithout an adequate allegation of facts
linking transactions in Europe to transactions and effects" in the
United States. 59 Under Twombly, it will not do to allege that
because defendants were colluding abroad, it can be inferred that
they must have been colluding in the United States as well.
Another notable illustration was Port Dock & Stone Corp. v.
Oldcastle Northeast, Inc.,60  where the Second Circuit
characterized Twombly as holding "that a complaint must allege
facts that are not merely consistent with the conclusion that the
defendant violated the law, but which actively and plausibly
suggest that conclusion."61  It cited a prior Second Circuit
decision as "interpreting Twombly as instituting a 'plausibility
standard,' requiring amplification of facts in certain contexts."62
Port Dock involved a supplier that had acquired its only
competitor and subsequently refused to continue selling to its
only distributor, preferring to distribute directly. 63 The court
affirmed dismissal of the complaint, inferring from some prior
cases that the supplier did not have an anticompetitive purpose:
"Our cases establish that when a monopolist has acquired its
monopoly at one level of a product market, its vertical expansion
into another level of the same product market will ordinarily be
for the purpose of increasing its efficiency, which is a prototypical
valid business purpose."64
The court specifically pointed to precedent recognizing that
"a monopolist can only extract one monopoly profit on a
product"65 and concluded on that basis that
58 In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d at 51.
59 Id. at 52.
- 507 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2007).
61 Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
62 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155-58 (2d Cir.
2007)). Iqbal, however, has been interpreted in some quarters to read Twombly
narrowly. See No Witness, LLC v. Cumulus Media Partners, LLC, No. 1:06-CV-1733
JEC, 2007 WL 4139399, at *3-4 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 13, 2007); Polzin v. Barna & Co., No.
3:07-CV-127, 2007 WL 2710705, at *6 n.6 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2007).
63 See Port Dock, 507 F.3d at 119-20.
64 Id. at 124.
65 Id.
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a complaint pleading that a defendant expanded vertically and
as a result, decided to discontinue doing business with its
erstwhile trading partners at the next level down, does not
plead an actionable refusal to deal. Such allegations are equally
consistent with the idea that the monopolist expected to
perform the second level service more efficiently than the old
trading partners and thus undertook the vertical integration for
a valid business reason, rather than for an anticompetitive
one.
66
The court went on to note that there may be circumstances in
which a monopolist's vertical expansion could be anticompetitive,
but the plaintiff had not alleged any of those.67 The court also
distinguished situations in which a monopolist has no legitimate
business reason for refusing to deal. 68
Here, in contrast, our vertical integration cases show that
Tilcon's[, the supplier's,] expansion into distribution was most
likely in pursuit of increased efficiency, and Port Dock has not
alleged any facts that would plausibly suggest that Tilcon's
purpose was anticompetitive. There was thus an apparent
legitimate business reason for Tilcon's refusal to deal. 69
Thus, the plausibility standard not only requires plaintiffs to
plead facts, but can enable courts to assume pro-competitive, or
at least competitively neutral, explanations for defendants'
conduct in the absence of contrary allegations.
These are not isolated cases. Numerous other antitrust
decisions across the country have continued to apply and
interpret Twombly's requirement of a factual showing of a
plausible claim, granting motions to dismiss where courts have
determined that a complaint lacked sufficient factual allegations
to warrant allowing a lawsuit to proceed.70  Even those courts
66 Id. at 125.
67 Id.
68 See id. at 124, 126.
69 Id. at 126.
70 See, e.g., NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 455 (6th Cir. 2007) (granting
motion to dismiss when "NicSand simply ha[d] not alleged facts establishing that
the agreements in and of themselves created market-entry barriers that caused it a
cognizable antitrust injury" (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974
(2007) (holding that plaintiffs must allege "enough facts" to "nudgeo their claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible"))); S.W.B. New Eng., Inc. v. R.A.B.
Food Group, LLC, No. 06 Civ. 15357, 2008 WL 540091, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27,
2008) ("Plaintiff has not alleged that it has, in fact, been forced to reduce prices in
order to compete, nor that such price reductions have caused it to incur a loss, and
thus it does not have standing to make a predatory pricing claim."); Arista Records
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that have not outright rejected the notion of "plus factors" have
held that the particular plus factors they were called upon to
examine failed to satisfy the Twombly test.71 At the same time,
the Twombly requirements have been satisfied in numerous
other antitrust cases, including both cases in which the alleged
agreement was in a writing as well as cases in which agreement
had to be inferred.72
Perhaps the surest way to gauge the impact of the Twombly
standard is to examine the antitrust allegations that are being
dismissed as insufficient. 73  In cases like In re Elevator
Litigation, Port Dock, and others described above, courts once
might have stretched to find an adequate claim among the
allegations that were pleaded. Today, courts expect plaintiffs to
sniff out enough factual content in advance to state a plausible
claim, and will not "fill in the blanks" if there are gaps in the
plaintiffs factual allegations or logic. Indeed, if the courts are
filling in any blanks today, it is to explain why the claim is
implausible and unlikely to be sound.
LLC v. Lime Group LLC, No. 06 Civ. 5936, 2007 WL 4267190, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
3, 2007) ("Lime Wire has failed to plead facts plausibly suggesting a 'meeting of the
minds' among any of the counter-defendants to refuse 'reasonable access' to their
hashes...."); Sheridan v. Marathon Petroleum Co., No. 1:06-cv-01233-SEB-JMS,
2007 WL 2900556, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2007) (dismissing claim because
"Plaintiffs have not alleged any additional facts to support this bare allegation that
would plausibly suggest an illegal agreement" (emphasis added)); In re Netflix
Antitrust Litig., 506 F. Supp. 2d 308, 321 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("[D]iscovery could indeed
prove expansive if allowed to proceed. Plaintiffs' claims have been dismissed because
they have failed to plead the requisite level of enforcement to sustain a Walker
Process claim.").
71 See Cosmetic Gallery, Inc. v. Schoeneman Corp., 495 F.3d 46, 53-55 (3d Cir.
2007); In re Late Fee & Over-Limit Fee Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 953, 963 (N.D. Cal.
2007).
72 See, e.g., In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litigation,
No. M: 07-CV-01819 CW, 2008 WL 426522, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2008); Cargill
Inc. v. Budine, No. CV-F-07-349-LJO-SMS, 2007 WL 4207908, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov.
27, 2007); Stand Energy Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 521 F. Supp. 2d
537, 540-41 (S.D.W. Va. 2007); Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc., 524 F.
Supp. 2d 1031, 1037-38 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Behrend v. Comcast Corp., No. 03-6604,
2007 WL 2221415, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2007).
73 In Twombly itself, the dissent pointed out that "the plaintiffs allege[d] in
three places ... that the [defendants] did in fact agree both to prevent competitors
from entering into their local markets and to forgo competition with each other." 127
S. Ct. at 1984.
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CONCLUSION
The lesson to be learned from Twombly is to investigate
more thoroughly than ever before filing a complaint. A strong
hunch plus the prospect of substantiating that hunch in
discovery is no longer enough.
Ultimately, the key issue always will be whether the plaintiff
has pleaded "enough facts" to state a plausible claim,74 without
resorting to "'a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.' 75 The principal challenge will be to distinguish facts
from conclusions masquerading as facts, 76 and decide how many
genuine facts are "enough." Although this always was pivotal on
motions to dismiss, Twombly increases the burden by replacing
the "no set of facts test" with a "show me the facts" test.
74 Id. at 1974.
75 Id. at 1965 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
76 The dissent in Twombly charged that the majority's "dichotomy between
factual allegations and 'legal conclusions' is the stuff of a bygone era .... That
distinction was a defining feature of code pleading,... but was conspicuously
abolished when the Federal Rules were enacted in 1938." Id. at 1985 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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